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Abstract: Triple encryption was proposed to increase the security of single encryption when the key is too short. In
the past, there have been several attacks in this encryption mode. When triple encryption is based on two
keys, Merkle and Hellman proposed a subtle meet-in-the-middle attack which can break it at a price similar to
breaking single encryption (but with nearly all the code book). When triple encryption is based on three keys,
Kelsey, Schneier, and Wagner proposed a related-key attack which can break it at a price similar to breaking
single encryption.
In this paper, we propose a new related-key attack against triple encryption which compares to breaking single
encryption in the two cases. Our attack against two-key triple-encryption has exactly the same performances
as a meet-in-the-middle on double-encryption. It is based on the discovery of fixed points in a decrypt-encrypt
sequence using related keys.
In the two-key case, it is comparable to the Merkle-Hellman attack (except that is uses related keys). In the
three-key case, it has a higher complexity than the Kelsey-Schneier-Wagner attack but can live with known
plaintexts.
1 INTRODUCTION
A classical security model for symmetric encryption
is the key recovery under chosen plaintext or cipher-
text attacks. Since ciphers are broken by generic at-
tacks such as exhaustive search, we must live with
these attacks and hope that their complexity is the
minimal cost for breaking the cipher. Indeed, a cipher
is secure if there is no attack better than exhaustive
search, i.e. if its complexity is lower than 2` where `
is the key length.
In the 90’s Biham and Knudsen proposed the no-
tion of related-key attack in which an adversary can
impose to change the secret key following some cho-
sen relation j (Biham, 1993; Biham, 1994; Knudsen,
1992). One problem is that related-key attacks open
the way to new generic attacks such as the ones by
Biham (Biham, 1996). So, exhaustive search may no
longer be the reference for assessing the security of a
cipher.
As an example of related-key attack, Kelsey,
Schneier, and Wagner presented an attack against
three-key triple encryption which shows that this
is not more secure than single encryption (Kelsey,
Schneier, Wagner, 1996).
In this paper, we first discuss on various ways to
compare the complexity related-key attacks. Follow-
ing a full-cost model, an attack is significant tmp < 2
`,
where r is the number of related keys, t (resp. m) is the
time (resp. memory) complexity, and p is the proba-
bility of success. In a more conservative approach,
we shall compare max

t
p ;m

with 2
`
2 . We can also
consider comparison in a restricted attack model in
order to limit some characteristics such as the number
of related keys. Then, we provide a related-key attack
against two-key triple encryption.
Related work on triple-DES. As far as we know,
the only related-key attacks against triple-DES are
the generic attack from Biham, the Kelsey-Schneier-
Wagner attack, and an attack from Phan (Biham,
1996; Kelsey, Schneier, Wagner, 1996; Phan, 2004).
There are other attacks using no related keys such
as attacks based on meet-in-the-middle by Merkle
and Hellman, known plaintext variants by Van
Oorschot and Wiener, and a nice optimization by
Lucks (Merkle and Hellman, 1981; Lucks, 1998;
van Oorschot and Wiener, 1990; van Oorschot and
Wiener, 1999). We use the table from Phan to com-
pare these attacks with ours (Phan, 2004). The fig-
ures1 are given on Table 1. Previous attacks are dis-
cussed in this paper.
Our contribution. In this paper, we present a new
attack on triple encryption which is based on the dis-
covery of fixed points for the mapping
x 7! EncK Enc 1j(K)
for some relation j. This discovery requires the en-
tire code book in a Broadcast Known Plaintext (BKP)
attack for EncK and Encj(K) which makes our data
complexity high. In the BKP model, the adversary
obtains a random plaintext and its encryption under
different keys. Once we have a (good) fixed point,
our attack becomes similar to a standard meet-in-the-
middle attack. So, it has a pretty low complexity. Fi-
nally, we show that our attack compares well to the
best ones so far. In the 2-key case, it becomes the best
known-plaintext attack.
2 COMPARING RELATED-KEY
ATTACKS
Given a dedicated attack against a cipher, it is tempt-
ing to compare it with exhaustive search and declare
the cipher broken if the attack is more efficient. This
is however a bit unfair because the attack model may
already have better generic attacks than exhaustive
search.
As an example, Biham’s generic attack (Biham,
1996) applies standard time-memory tradeoffs in the
related key model. His attack consists of collect-
ing yi = EncKi(x) for a fixed x and r related keys.
That is, we use r chosen plaintexts. Then, it builds
a dictionary (yi; i) and run a multi-target key recov-
ery to find one K such that EncK(x) is in the dictio-
nary. With t attempts, the probability of success is
p= 1  (1  r2 `)t  1  e rt2 ` . The dictionary has
size m = r(`+ logr) bits. For simplicity, we approx-
imate m  r. In particular, for t = r = 2`=2, we have
p 1  e 1  63%, so this is much cheaper than ex-
haustive search.
The complexity of a related-key attack can be
characterized by a multi-dimensional vector consist-
ing of
1with sightly different units: our time complexities are
measured in terms of triple encryption instead of single en-
cryption; our memory complexities are measured in bits in-
stead of 32-bit words; our number of keys include the target
one and not only the related ones
 the number of related keys r (the number of keys
which are involved is r, i.e. r = 1 when the attack
uses no related keys);
 the data complexity d (e.g. the number of
chosen plaintexts), where we may distinguish
known plaintexts (KP), broadcast known plain-
texts (BKP), chosen plaintexts (CP), and chosen
ciphertexts (CC) as the may be subject to differ-
ent costs in the attack model;
 the time complexity of the adversary t, where we
may distinguish the precomputation complexity
and the online running time complexity;
 the memory complexity m, which may further
distinguish quick-access or slow-access memory,
read/write memory or read-only memory;
 the probability of success p.
There are many other possible refinements.
We can compare attacks by using the partial order-
ing p on vectors (r;d; t;m; 1p ), i.e.
(r;d; t;m; p)p (r0;d0; t 0;m0; p0)
m
r  r0 and d  d0 and t  t 0 and m m0 and p p0
When a category such as the data complexity d has
a sub-characterization (dKP;dBKP;dCP;dCC), the d 
d0 implies an other partial ordering on these sub-
characteristics. We can say that an attack is insignifi-
cant if there is a generic attack with a lower complex-
ity vector. It is not always possible to compare two
multi-dimensional vectors. So, it is not clear whether
an attack is significant when it is not insignificant. So,
it is quite common to extend the partial ordering p
using different models which are discussed below.
Conservative model. Traditionally, t, m, and p are
combined into a “complexity” which is arbitrarily
measured by max

t
p ;m

. We could equivalently
adopt tp +m since these operations yield the same or-
ders of magnitude.
The idea behind this arbitrary notion is that we
can normalize the success probability p by using 1p
sessions of the attack. So, t has a factor 1p corre-
sponding to 1p different sessions. Clearly, the running
time of every session adds up whereas their memory
complexity does not. If we make no special treatment
for r and d, we can just extend this simple notion by
adding them in the time complexity t (since the ad-
versary must at least read the received data). We can
thus replace t by max(r;d; t). This leads us to
Cconservative(r;d; t;m; p) =max

r
p
;
d
p
;
t
p
;m

2
Table 1: Attacks against Triple-DES.
parameters complexity
target data memory time #keys Cconservative reference
2K-3DES 2 (KP) 27 2112 1 2112 exhaustive search
256 (CP) 262 256 256 262 (Biham, 1996) (generic)
256 (KP) 258 2112 1 2112 (van Oorschot and Wiener, 1990; van
Oorschot and Wiener, 1999)
233 (KP) 291:5 286 2 291:5 (Phan, 2004)
265 (KP) 272 256 2 272 this paper
265 (BKP) 263 256 2 266 this paper
264 (KP) 264 256 1 264 (Merkle and Hellman, 1981) variant
256 (CP) 263 256 1 263 (Merkle and Hellman, 1981)
3K-3DES 3 (KP) 28 2168 1 2168 exhaustive search
284 (CP) 292 284 284 292 (Biham, 1996) (generic)
232 (KP) 290 2104 1 2104 (Lucks, 1998)
3 (CP) 258 2110 1 2110 (Merkle and Hellman, 1981)
233 (KP) 235 286 2 286 (Phan, 2004)
267 (KP) 272 257 6 272 this paper
267 (BKP) 263 257 6 267 this paper
2 (BKP) 258 254 2 258 (Kelsey, Schneier, Wagner, 1996)
For instance, the Biham attacks (Biham, 1996) have
complexity 2
1
2 `.2
In some cases, there may be a special treatment
for r and d though, especially regarding the 1p fac-
tor. Actually, the current 1p factor corresponds to the
worst case where iterating an attack requires new re-
lated keys. In many cases, related keys could just be
reused, which means that the total number of related
keys may be r instead of rp . We can just keep in mind
that the Cconservative formula may not be well adapted
to attacks with a probability of success far from 1.
We should rather normalize the attack using the most
appropriate technique before applying the formula on
the normalized attack.
This kind of rule of the thumb is pretty conve-
nient because two attacks can always be compared by
Cconservative: let
(r;d; t;m; p)conservative (r0;d0; t 0;m0; p0)
m
Cconservative(r;d; t;m; p)Cconservative(r0;d0; t 0;m0; p0)
This defines a total ordering. An attack is said conser-
vative-significant if it is better than generic ones fol-
lowing the conservative ordering. That is, an attack is
conservative-significant if and only if
Cconservative(r;d; t;m; p)< 2
`
2
2Strictly speaking, we shall have a 1p factor correspond-
ing to p= 63% but this would give the same order of mag-
nitude and this simple formula aims at comparing orders of
magnitude.
Limited related-key models. Arguably, related
keys (or event chosen plaintexts or ciphertexts) are
harder to obtain, compared to spending time in the
attack. Namely, an attack of complexity 2
3
4 `, r = 1,
and d = 1 is declared not significant with conservative
because of the Biham attack (Biham, 1996) of com-
plexity 2
1
2 `, which is a bit unfair. So, we could either
go back to some partial ordering or to some attack
model restrictions. For instance, a common model
(when we do not care about related-key attacks) con-
sists of limiting to r = 1. A natural model would
consists of limiting r  Br for some bound Br. Fi-
nally, we can compare an attack with the best generic
one using no more related keys. That is, we say that
an attack is conservative-significant in the RK-limited
model if its conservative complexity is better than
the one for all generic attacks using no more related
keys. If (t;r;d;m; p) is the complexity vector of the
attack, we shall compareCconservative(r;d; t;m; p) with
the one of all (t 0;r0;r0;r0;1  e r0t 02 `) for all t 0 and
r0  r. Clearly, the minimal complexity is reached for
r0 = r and t 0 = 2`=r0. So, the attack is conservative-
significant in the RK-limited model if
Cconservative(r;d; t;m; p)<
2`
r
Other limited models. We may also consider other
limited models. For instance we can restrict to at-
tacks using known plaintexts only. All combinations
of limitations can be imagined. The relevance of these
3
limited models shall be driven by significance for ap-
plications.
Full-cost model. Wiener introduced the full cost
expressed as O(t+ tmc + t
p
cr3) where c is the num-
ber of processors and r is the rate of access to
the memory of all processors per time unit (Wiener,
2004). (We assume here that parameters are normal-
ized so that we can assume p = 1.) Using a single
processor and r= 1, this simplifies to O(tm). Again,
we replace t by max(r;d; t) to integrate r and d. So,
we could also consider
Cfull(r;d; t;m; p) =max(r;d; t)
m
p
(1)
and define
(r;d; t;m; p)full (r0;d0; t 0;m0; p0)
m
Cfull(r;d; t;m; p)Cfull(r0;d0; t 0;m0; p0)
The total ordering which takes parallelism tricks is a
bit more complicated. Without using any parallelism
trick, Biham’s generic attacks have d = r, t = 2`=r,
and m = r. So, their full cost if max(r2;2`). Again,
this is relevant for r  2 `2 only and the full cost is 2`
no matter r. In this case, exhaustive search with r= 2`
has the same full cost. An attack is full-significant if
and only if
Cfull(r;d; t;m; p)< 2`
As a rule of the thumb, we could adopt the simple
criterion tmp < 2
`.
Note that Equation (1) only gives an upper bound
on the full cost which can be pessimistic. For in-
stance, it was shown that meet-in-the-middle (Diffie
and Hellman, 1977) with a key of size `k has a full
cost of 2
4
3 `k and may also be reduced to 2
6
5 `k using
parallelism (Wiener, 2004). So, the comparison based
on full cost shall be done with great care.
As an application we can look at recent at-
tacks on AES working with p = 1. (See
Table 2.) As we can see, the Biryukov-
Khovratovich attack (Biryukov and Khovratovich,
2009) on AES-192 is only conservative-significant
in the RK-limited model, thanks to the low num-
ber of related keys, but it is not conservative-
significant. The Biryukov-Khovratovich-Nikolic´ at-
tack (Biryukov, Khovratovich, Nikolic´, 2009) on
AES-256 is conservative-significant in the RK-
limited model, thanks to the low number of re-
lated keys, but it is not conservative-significant.
The Biryukov-Khovratovich attack (Biryukov and
Khovratovich, 2009) on AES-256 is significant for all
criteria.
3 SEMI-GENERIC
RELATED-KEY ATTACKS
AGAINST 3DES
We propose here a related-key attack against 3DES.
It is semi-generic in the sense that is does not depend
on DES but only on the structure of triple encryption
which is used in 3DES, that is the encrypt-decrypt-
encrypt structure. We consider two cases: the 3-key
and 2-key triple encryptions defined by
EncK1;K2;K3 = CK1 C 1K2 CK3
EncK1;K2 = CK1 C 1K2 CK1
We denote by `k the length of the Ki subkeys and by
`m the block length.
3.1 3-Key Triple Encryption Case
We use the relation j(K1;K2;K3) = (K2;K1;K3). We
observe that for K = (K1;K2;K3), we have
EncK Enc 1j(K) =

CK1 C 1K2
2
The idea of the attack consists of looking for a plain-
text x such that EncK(x) = Encj(K)(x). By enumer-
ating the codebook we can find one such x with com-
plexity 2`m . Indeed, this would be a fixed point for the
above permutation.
Given a random permutation over a domain of size
2`m , the expected number of fixed points is 1. Addi-
tionally, there are 12 cycles of length 2, on average.
So,CK1 C 1K2 has a number a of fixed points such that
E(a) = 1 and a number b of length-2 cycles such that
E(b) = 12 . In

CK1 C 1K2
2
, the a fixed points are still
fixed points, but elements of length-2 cycles become
fixed points as well. We call them bad fixed points.
After enumerating the codebook, we have a+2b fixed
points. When a = 0, there are no good fixed points
and it is a bad luck. This happens with probability
e 1. Our attack succeeds when a > 0, so with a suc-
cess probability of p= 1  e 1. Note that if a+2b is
odd, we are ensured that there is a good fixed point.
Assuming that x is a good fixed point, it is a fixed
point of CK1 C 1K2 . We can enumerate all `k-bit keys
and find pairs (K1;K2) such thatCK1(x) =CK2(x)with
complexity 2`k using a meet-in-the-middle algorithm.
The correct (K1;K2) pair is always suggested if x is a
good fixed point. Other pairs are called wrong pairs.
We eliminate wrong pairs by using several iterations
of this method.
Concretely, our attach starts as shown on Fig. 1.
So, we use r = 2n related keys, d = n2`m+1 broadcast
4
Table 2: Attacks on AES
parameters complexity significance
target data memory time #keys Cconservative conservative RK-limited reference
AES-128 1 1 2128 1 2128 exhaustive search
AES-192 1 1 2192 1 2192 exhaustive search
4 4 2190 4 2190 (Biham, 1996)
296 296 296 296 296 (Biham, 1996)
2123 2152 2176 4 2176 no yes (Biryukov and Khovra-
tovich, 2009)
AES-256 1 1 2256 1 2256 exhaustive search
4 4 2254 4 2254 (Biham, 1996)
235 235 2221 235 2221 (Biham, 1996)
2128 2128 2128 2128 2128 (Biham, 1996)
2131 265 2131 235 2131 no yes (Biryukov, Khovra-
tovich, Nikolic´, 2009)
2100 277 2100 4 2100 yes yes (Biryukov and Khovra-
tovich, 2009)
1: select c1 = 0 and c2; : : : ;cn at random
2: for i= 1 to n do
3: set a list Li to the empty list
4: repeat
5: get a new BKP xwith keys Kci and j(K
ci)
6: let y (resp. z) be the encryption of x under
key K ci (resp. j(K ci))
7: if y= z then
8: add y in list Li
9: end if
10: until until all x cover the entire code book
11: end for
12: set I to the set of all i such that #Li > 0
Figure 1: Attack on Triple Encryption (First Part — Broad-
cast Known Plaintext)
1: select c1 = 0 and c2; : : : ;cn at random
2: for i= 1 to n do
3: set a list Li to the empty list
4: dump the entire code book for key K  ci
(EncKci(x) stored at address h(x))
5: repeat
6: get a new KP x with key j(K ci)
7: let z be the encryption of x under key j(K
ci)
8: let y to the content of cell h(x)
9: if y= z then
10: add y in list Li
11: end if
12: until until all x cover the entire code book
13: end for
14: set I to the set of all i such that #Li > 0
Figure 2: Attack on Triple Encryption (First Part — Known
Plaintext)
known plaintexts, and negligible time and memory so
far. There is a known plaintext variant on Fig. 2 which
uses d known plaintexts m = `m2`m . Then, for each i
we have a list Li of fixed points for

CK1(i) C 1K2(i)
2
.
If Li has an odd number of terms, we are ensured that
there is at least one fixed point for CK1(i) C 1K2(i) in it.
Then, the attack continues as shown on Fig. 3.
The loop on K1(i) takes t = 132
`k triple encryptions
and m = (`m+ `k)2`k bits of memory. The loop on
K2(i) essentially takes t = 132
`k triple encryptions (the
inner loop on the found K2(i) is negligible).
The loop on (K1;K2;c) depends on the size of
R. We denote Rn the expected number of remaining
wrong keys in R using parameter n. Let n 1 be the
number of other lists which have an odd number of
fixed points. We have 22`k potential pairs but an equa-
tion to satisfy on n`m bits to end up in R. So, we have
Rn  22`k n`m . We have
E(n) = 1+(n 1) å
a odd
e 1
a!
= 1+(n 1)1  e
  32
2
which is nearly 0:6116+ 0:3884 n. So, this loop
takes t = 1+Rn3 2
`k triple encryptions for a good fixed
point and t = Rn3 2
`k for a bad one. In what follows we
adjust n so that Rn  0. Namely, for n= 6 `k`m , we have
Rn  2 0:3`k 0:6`m so we can neglect wrong pairs.
The main loop and the x loop iterate until it takes
a good fixed point. For each Li we have exactly i
cycles of length u with probability e
  1u
uii! . Let assume
the probabilities for u= 1 and u= 2 are independent.
For instance, the best case is a > 1 (some good fixed
points) and b = 0 (no bad fixed points) with proba-
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1: sort I in increasing order with first the list of i’s
with #Li odd then the remaining ones
2: while I is not empty do
3: pick the first i 2 I and remove it from I
4: for all x in Li do
5: initialize a hash table H and a list R
6: for all K1(i) do
7: store (CK1(i)(x);K1(i)) in H
8: end for
9: for all K2(i) do
10: for each K1(i) such that
(CK2(i)(x);K1(i)) 2 H do
11: compute K1 and K2 from K1(i) and
K2(i) using ci and set c= 0
12: for each j 2 I do
13: compute K1( j) and K2( j) from K1
and K2 using c j
14: look if there is y 2 L j such that
CK1( j)(y) =CK2( j)(y)
15: if there is such y then
16: increment c
17: end if
18: if there is no such y and j is odd then
19: exit the j loop and set c to 0
20: end if
21: end for
22: if c 6= 0, add (K1;K2;c) in list R sorted
by decreasing c
23: end for
24: end for
25: end for
26: for each (K1;K2;c) 2 R sorted by c do
27: for all K3 do
28: if (K1;K2;K3) consistent with data then
29: yield (K1;K2;K3) and exit
30: end if
31: end for
32: end for
33: end while
34: attack failed
Figure 3: Attack on 3-Key Triple Encryption (Second Part)
bility e 
1
2 (1  e 1)  0:38. We denote by Nn (resp.
Nn ) the expected number of iterations of the i and x
loops (resp. in the case that the attack succeeds). In
the case of failure (a = 0), we have 2b iterations so
the expected number is 1 for each list. That is, the ex-
pected number of iterations before the attack fails is
n. Since this happens with probability e n, we have
Nn =
Nn ne n
1  e n
Given a > 0 good fixed points and 2b bad ones, the
expected number of iterations is
Nn(a;b) =
1
a+2b
a
 2b+1å
i=1
i

a+2b  i
a 1

which does not depend on n. For a = 0, it is of
Nn(0;b) = 2b+Nn 1 which does depend on n. Fur-
thermore, we have
Nn =å
a;b
Nn(a;b)
e 
3
2
a!2bb!
So,
Nn = å
b
(2b+Nn 1)
e 
3
2
2bb!
+ å
a>0;b
Nn(a;b)
e 
3
2
a!2bb!
= (Nn 1+1)e 1+ å
a>0;b
Nn(a;b)
e 
3
2
a!2bb!
where the sum does not depend on n. We computed
some values of Nn in Table 3. So, the number of iter-
ations can be approximated to 2 in any success case.
Finally, the total complexity is of
r = 2n
d = n2`m+1
t =

2
  2
32
`k + 132
`kRn

+ 132
`k if success
t = n
  2
32
`k + 132
`kRn

if failure
m =

(`m+ `k)2`k for CP variant
max(`m2`m ;(`m+ `k)2`k) for KP variant
p = 1  e n
In general, we suggest n  6 `k`m to get t = 532`k in a
success case.
In the case of DES, we have `k = 56 and `m = 64.
We take n= 3 to get n  1:777 and Rn  2 1:72. So,
we use r = 6 keys. We use d = 267 chosen plaintexts
or ciphertexts, or known plaintexts. The time com-
plexity is t = 257 triple encryptions in the all cases.
The memory complexity is m= 263 bits in the chosen
message variant and m = 272 in the known plaintext
variant. The key to recover has 168 bits. The attack
succeeds with probability p= 95%. Note that this at-
tack is better than the generic related-key attack using
tradeoffs. It works in the ideal cipher model. Bellare
and Rogaway proved that the best (non-related-key)
generic attack in the ideal cipher model would require
at least 278 encryptions (Bellare and Rogaway, 2006).
This example shows that the result no longer holds in
the related-key model.
In the case we would like to use a triple AES en-
cryption, we obtain different results which are sum-
marized in Table 4.
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Table 3: Some values for the expected number of iterations Nn and Nn
n 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Nn 1:264 1:729 1:900 1:963 1:987 1:995 1:998 1:999 2:000 2:000
Nn 1:418 1:687 1:843 1:925 1:966 1:985 1:994 1:997 1:999 2:000
Comparison with the Kelsey-Schneier-Wagner at-
tack. Kelsey, Schneier, and Wagner presented a
related-key attack against 3-key triple encryption
which has similar performances (Kelsey, Schneier,
Wagner, 1996). It consists in using
j(K1;K2;K3) = (K1D;K2;K3)
Then, EncK Enc 1j(K) = CK1 C 1K1D which only de-
pends on K1. So, exhaustive search can recover K1.
For DES, this attack has r= 2, d = 2 (known and cho-
sen plaintexts), t = 256 encryptions, m= 256 bits, and
p= 100%. So, it is better than our attack. Contrarily
to ours, it has no extension to 2-key triple encryption.
However, this attack extends to the encrypt-encrypt-
encrypt triple encryption mode whereas our attack re-
stricts to the encrypt-decrypt-encrypt construction.
Note that getting EncK  Enc 1j(K)(y) = z on a
random y is equivalent to getting EncK(x) = y and
Encj(K)(x) = z on a random x. So, this attack is in
the BKP model.
Comparison with the Phan attack. In the category
of known plaintext attacks, Phan (Phan, 2004) uses
j(K1;K2;K3) = (K1;K3;K2)
(which is similar to our relation) and a slide attack. It
breaks 3-key triple encryption using r = 2, d = 233
(known and chosen plaintexts), t = 132
88 triple en-
cryptions, and m = 238 bits. This attack extends to
encrypt-encrypt-encrypt and to 2-key triple encryp-
tion (with a memory complexity inflated to m= 294:5
bits). Our known plaintext attack uses a quite lower
time complexity but a higher number of chosen plain-
texts.
3.2 2-Key Triple Encryption Case
We use the relation j(K1;K2) = (K2;K1). We observe
that for K = (K1;K2), we have
EncK Enc 1j(K) =

CK1 C 1K2
3
Fixed points of EncK  Enc 1j(K) are fixed points of
CK1(x) C 1K2 or points in cycles of length 3. We just
proceed as in the previous attack. The probability to
have a fixed points and b cycles of length 3 is e
  43
a!3bb! .
So, E(a) = 1 and E(b) = 13 . The number of values x
obtained is a+ 3b. If it is no multiple of 3 then we
have a good fixed point for sure.
The final complexity is very similar to the 3-key
encryption case. The difference is that we no longer
need the exhaustive search on K3 and wrong (K1;K2)
pairs are discarded by a simple consistency check. We
can work with n = 1 and p = 63%. The formulas
become
Nn(a;b) =
1
a+3b
a
 3b+1å
i=1
i

a+3b  i
a 1

Nn(0;b) = 3b+Nn 1
Nn = å
a;b
Nn(a;b)
e 
4
3
a!3bb!
= (Nn 1+1)e 1+ å
a>0;b
Nn(a;b)
e 
4
3
a!3bb!
Nn =
Nn ne n
1  e n
The new table for Nn gives identical results. So, the
new complexity is
r = 2n
d = n2`m+1
t =
 4
32
`k if success
t = 2n3 2
`k if failure
m =

(`m+ `k)2`k for CP variant
max(`m2`m ;(`m+ `k)2`k) for KP variant
p = 1  e n
The first part of the algorithm works like in the 3-
key case with two variants on Fig. 1 and Fig. 2. The
second part of the algorithm is shown on Fig. 4.
In the case of DES, we take n = 1, so r = 2. We
use d = 265 chosen plaintexts or ciphertexts. The
time complexity is t = 256 triple encryptions in the
all cases. The memory complexity is m= 263 bits and
the key to recover has 112 bits. The known plaintext
variant uses d = 265 known plaintexts and the mem-
ory complexity becomesm= 272 bits. The attack suc-
ceeds with probability p = 63%. Comparison with
other attacks is presented in Table 1.
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Table 4: Semi-Generic Attack against Triple Encryption (Chosen Message Variant)
2-key 3-key
cipher DES AES128 AES192 AES256 DES AES128 AES192 AES256
key size 116 256 384 512 168 384 576 768
`k 56 128 192 256 56 128 192 256
`m 64 128 128 128 64 128 128 128
#keys 2 2 2 2 6 8 14 18
#chosen plaintexts 265 2129 2129 2129 267 2131 2132 2132
time complexity 256 2128 2192 2256 257 2129 2193 2257
memory complexity 263 2136 2200 2255 263 2136 2200 2265
success probability 63% 63% 63% 63% 95% 98% 100% 100%
Cconservative 266 2136 2200 2265 267 2136 2200 2265
1: sort I in increasing order with first the list of i’s
with #Li not multiple of 3 then the remaining ones
2: while I is not empty do
3: pick the first i 2 I and remove it from I
4: for all x in Li do
5: initialize a hash table H
6: for all K1(i) do
7: store (CK1(i)(x);K1(i)) in H
8: end for
9: for all K2(i) do
10: for each K1(i) such that
(CK2(i)(x);K1(i)) 2 H do
11: compute K1 and K2 from K1(i) and
K2(i) using ci and set c= 0
12: if (K1;K2;K3) consistent with data
then
13: yield (K1;K2;K3) and exit
14: end if
15: end for
16: end for
17: end for
18: end while
19: attack failed
Figure 4: Attack on 2-Key Triple Encryption (Second Part)
Comparison with the Merkle-Hellman meet-in-
the-middle attack. Merkle and Hellman proposed
to use a simple collision algorithm to find colli-
sions between the list of all C 1K2 (0) and the list of
all C 1K1 (Enc(C
 1
K1 (0))) (Merkle and Hellman, 1981).
This requires to encrypt all chosen plaintextsC 1K1 (0).
A variant with known plaintexts only can be done as
follows: first we make a dictionary of all (CK1(0;K1)
in addition to the dictionary of all (C 1K2 (0);K2). Then,
every time we receive a plaintext/ciphertext pair (x;y)
we look if x is in the first dictionary to find K1. If
it is, we compute z = C 1K1 (y) and get a new element
C 1K1 (Enc(C
 1
K1 (0))) = z. We can look for z in the sec-
ond dictionary. This doubles the memory complexity
and increase the data complexity to essentially the en-
tire code book.
This attack has lower complexity parameters than
ours for the chosen plaintext variant. The known
plaintext variants are equivalent (except that we use
related keys and the Merkle-Hellman attack does not).
4 CONCLUSION
We presented a new attack on triple-encryption which
uses related keys. It can use chosen messages or
known plaintexts but require the entire code book for
related keys. Our attack is the best in the known
plaintext attack category in the 3-key case. Be-
sides, the best attacks remain the Merkle-Hellman
attack (Merkle and Hellman, 1981) in the 2-key
case and the Kelsey-Schneier-Wagner attack (Kelsey,
Schneier, Wagner, 1996) in the 3-key case.
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